Certificate lifecycle: validity, renewal and revocation
How long charging certificates live, how they are renewed and revoked, what a wrong clock does to them, and the failures test benches see most.
How long each certificate lives
| Certificate | Typical validity | Why |
|---|---|---|
| V2G, MO and OEM roots | Decades (policies of up to about 40 years are common) | Replacing a root means updating every car and charger that holds it |
| Sub-CAs | Several years | Must cover the lifetime of the leaves they sign |
| SECC certificate | Short: months to about a year | A car often cannot check revocation, so a short life limits the damage of a stolen charger key |
| Contract certificate | About one to two years | Tied to a customer contract; renewed with CertificateUpdate (ISO 15118-2) or a new installation (ISO 15118-20) |
| OEM provisioning certificate | Long, often the service life of the car | Only used to install contracts, installed once at production |
| CPS leaf | Short | Signs installation data online and can be replaced at any time |
The validity periods in this table are typical values from deployed PKI policies, not requirements. The periods ISO 15118-2 and ISO 15118-20 recommend, if any, are to be checked against the standards.
Path validation checks every certificate of the chain against the current time, not only the leaf. A sub-CA that expires before the leaves it signed silently breaks all of them on its expiry date, which is why policies keep an issuer valid at least as long as anything it issues.
Expiry and renewal
- A contract certificate close to its end is accepted with
OK_CertificateExpiresSoon. The car should renew it in a later session: CertificateUpdate in ISO 15118-2, a new CertificateInstallation in ISO 15118-20. - An expired contract certificate is refused with
FAILED_CertificateExpiredin ISO 15118-2. ISO 15118-20 answersWARNING_CertificateExpired, and the charger may fall back to external identification. - A contract certificate that is not valid yet gives
WARNING_CertificateNotYetValidin ISO 15118-20. Check the clocks before the certificate. - An expired SECC certificate stops the session in the TLS handshake: the car sends the alert
certificate_expired(45) after the charger's Certificate message, or simply closes the connection.
The code dictionary lists all of these under response-code, response-code-20 and tls-alert.
Revocation: CRL and OCSP
A certificate revocation list (CRL, RFC 5280) is a signed list of revoked serial numbers that a CA publishes at intervals; a verifier downloads it and looks the certificate up. OCSP (RFC 6960) answers for one certificate at a time with a signed response that is valid between its thisUpdate and nextUpdate times. Both need network access, which a car in a car park usually does not have while it negotiates.
- Contract certificates are checked by the charger or its backend, which are online. A revoked contract ends as
FAILED_CertificateRevoked(ISO 15118-2) orWARNING_CertificateRevoked(ISO 15118-20), a cancelled contract asFAILED_ContractCanceled. - For the charger chain, ISO 15118-20 moves the check to the charger: the car asks for OCSP stapling (status_request) and the charger attaches a recent OCSP response to each certificate of its chain, as TLS 1.3 allows per certificate entry (RFC 8446 4.4.2.1). The charger has to refresh these responses before they expire.
- A stapled response that is stale, missing or signed by the wrong responder makes a strict car abort with
bad_certificate_status_response(113) orcertificate_revoked(44).
Whether ISO 15118-2 requires or allows any revocation check of the SECC chain in TLS 1.2 is to be checked. In practice first generation cars rely on the short life of the SECC certificate.
When a clock is wrong
- The car: a controller without a set real time clock (a new car, or one whose 12 V battery was disconnected) may believe it is years in the past. Every charger certificate is then not yet valid. A clock in the future makes them expired. The car aborts the handshake with
certificate_expiredorbad_certificate, or without any alert. - The charger: a wrong clock makes it judge contract certificates wrongly (
WARNING_CertificateNotYetValid,FAILED_CertificateExpired) and makes its stapled OCSP responses look stale or premature to the car. - The capture PC: PK-01 uses the timestamps of the capture, not the clock of either device. Synchronise the capture PC; with only relative timestamps PK-01 reports not applicable rather than a false expiry.
When a handshake fails right after the charger's Certificate message on one car but not on others, compare the car's idea of the date with the notBefore of the whole chain before suspecting the PKI.
Size limits
The ISO 15118-2 message schema limits a certificate to 800 bytes (the libcbv2g codec uses the same bound). This tool applies that value to certificates of TLS 1.2 chains as well (limit key pki.maxCertificateBytes), and the profile still marks it for verification. ISO 15118-20 allows 1600 bytes per certificate (V2G20-1234, key pki.maxCertificateBytesIso20). PK-02 reports any certificate above the limit.
Certificates grow through long subject names, policy identifiers, CRL and OCSP URLs, extra extensions and, for ISO 15118-20, the larger secp521r1 keys and signatures. A certificate over the limit may not fit the fixed buffers of an embedded EXI codec at all, so the failure shows as an encoding error or a dropped connection rather than a clean response code.
Failures seen on test benches
| What the capture shows | Likely cause | Where to look |
|---|---|---|
Alert unknown_ca (48) after the charger's Certificate | The chain ends in a root the car does not hold, typically a test root on one side and a production root on the other | TLS tab: issuer of the top certificate; TL-01 |
Alert bad_certificate (42) or a reset after Certificate | A missing sub-CA (only the leaf sent), certificates out of order, or a malformed date | PK-02 and the certificate count: a leaf and two sub-CAs are expected |
Alert unsupported_certificate (43) | Key usage that does not fit the suite: ECDHE_ECDSA needs digitalSignature, the static ECDH_ECDSA suite of ISO 15118-2 needs keyAgreement (RFC 4492); or a sub-CA without the CA flag and keyCertSign | TLS tab: key usage and basic constraints of each certificate |
Alert certificate_expired (45) | An expired leaf, sub-CA or test root (bench PKIs are often issued for a short period and forgotten), or a wrong car clock | PK-01 for the leaf, the TLS tab for the rest of the chain |
Handshake completes, then FAILED_CertChainError | The charger lacks the MO root (or the test MO root) of the contract | PaymentDetailsReq in the message detail; response-code dictionary |
FAILED_NoCertificateAvailable to CertificateInstallationReq | No backend connection, or no contract provisioned for the car's PCID | Charger and backend logs |
| Unknown critical extension, GeneralizedTime before 2050 | Defaults of general purpose PKI tooling | PK-02 |
TL-01 reports any alert and TL-04 a handshake that does not complete; the code dictionary (tls-alert) explains each alert number.
Sources
- ISO 15118-2:2014, certificate profiles, response codes, CertificateUpdate
- ISO 15118-20:2022, V2G20-1234 (certificate size), TLS and OCSP requirements of clause 7.7.3
- RFC 5280, validity, path validation, CRL
- RFC 6960, OCSP
- RFC 8446, TLS 1.3 alerts and certificate status
- RFC 4492, ECC cipher suites for TLS 1.2 and their key usage