Plug and Charge and its PKI
The certificate hierarchies behind Plug and Charge, who issues and holds each certificate, and how ISO 15118-2 and ISO 15118-20 use them on the wire.
Four hierarchies, one leaf each
Plug and Charge replaces the RFID card with certificates. The charger proves who it is in the TLS handshake with its SECC certificate; the car proves which contract pays by signing messages with the private key of its contract certificate; and the contract itself reaches the car through a certificate installation that the car maker's provisioning certificate protects. Each of these comes from its own public key infrastructure, and each chain has at most a root, two sub-CAs and a leaf.
| Certificate | Issued by | Held by | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| V2G root CA | Itself (self-signed), run by a V2G root operator | Car and charger, as a trust anchor; never sent on the wire | Anchor of the charger (CPO) and provisioning service (CPS) chains; in ISO 15118-2 it may also anchor contract chains |
| CPO Sub-CA 1 | V2G root CA | The PKI operator or the charge point operator | Signs CPO Sub-CA 2 |
| CPO Sub-CA 2 | CPO Sub-CA 1 | The charge point operator | Signs SECC certificates |
| SECC certificate (leaf) | CPO Sub-CA 2 | The charger, with its private key | TLS server authentication |
| MO or eMSP root CA | Itself, run by or for the mobility operator | Chargers and backends, as a trust anchor | Anchor of contract certificate chains |
| MO Sub-CA 1 and 2 | MO root (or a V2G root), then Sub-CA 1 | The mobility operator | Sign contract certificates |
| Contract certificate (leaf) | MO Sub-CA 2 | The car, with its private key | Carries the eMAID in its subject; signs AuthorizationReq and MeteringReceiptReq |
| OEM root CA | Itself, run by the car maker | Car maker and the provisioning backends | Anchor of OEM chains |
| OEM Sub-CA 1 and 2 | OEM root, then Sub-CA 1 | The car maker | Sign provisioning certificates (and vehicle certificates in ISO 15118-20) |
| OEM provisioning certificate (leaf) | OEM Sub-CA 2 | The car, installed at production | Identifies the car by its PCID; signs CertificateInstallationReq; its key protects the contract key during installation |
| Vehicle certificate (ISO 15118-20) | OEM sub-CA | The car | TLS client authentication in mutual TLS |
| CPS Sub-CA 1 and 2 | V2G root, then Sub-CA 1 | The PKI operator | Sign the CPS leaf |
| CPS leaf | CPS Sub-CA 2 | The certificate provisioning service | Signs the installation data in CertificateInstallationRes so the car can verify it against a V2G root |
The issuer of the ISO 15118-20 vehicle certificate is given here as an OEM sub-CA, which is how deployed OEM PKIs work; the exact chain the standard prescribes is to be checked against ISO 15118-20.
The message schemas leave room for these depths: a certificate chain element carries a leaf plus up to 4 sub-certificates in ISO 15118-2 and up to 3 in ISO 15118-20, and ListOfRootCertificateIDs names up to 5 roots in ISO 15118-2 and up to 20 in ISO 15118-20 (as the libcbv2g codec generated from the schemas has them).
Trust anchors, several roots and cross-certification
- The car holds one or more V2G roots (to check the charger chain and the CPS signature), its OEM provisioning certificate and key, and after installation one or more contract chains with their keys. In ISO 15118-20 it also holds a vehicle certificate chain.
- The charger holds its SECC chain and key, possibly one chain per V2G root it is enrolled under, the V2G roots, and the MO roots it needs to check contract chains locally. Many chargers forward the contract chain to their backend instead and wait with EVSEProcessing Ongoing.
- The backend holds MO and OEM roots and talks to the OCSP responders and the provisioning service.
More than one V2G root exists in the market, and a car that trusts only root A cannot validate a charger chain under root B. Three mechanisms deal with this. The car tells the other side which roots it holds: ListOfRootCertificateIDs in the certificate messages, and in ISO 15118-20 the certificate_authorities extension of the ClientHello, so the charger can pick a matching chain. A root operator can cross-certify another root (issue a certificate for its key), so one chain validates to either anchor. And industry trust lists collect the approved roots that car makers and operators install.
Whether and how a car tells a TLS 1.2 charger which V2G roots it holds (for example the trusted_ca_keys extension of RFC 6066) is to be checked against ISO 15118-2.
ISO 15118-2 compared with ISO 15118-20
| Aspect | ISO 15118-2 | ISO 15118-20 |
|---|---|---|
| TLS version | TLS 1.2 | TLS 1.3 (clause 7.7.3) |
| Cipher suites | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 and TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |
| Keys and signatures | secp256r1, ECDSA with SHA-256 | secp521r1 with ECDSA and SHA-512, or Ed448 (x448 for key exchange) |
| Client authentication | None in TLS; the car proves its contract by signing at the application layer | Mutual TLS: the charger asks for the vehicle certificate |
| Revocation in the handshake | Not part of the handshake profile | OCSP stapling requested with status_request |
| Largest certificate | 800 bytes in the message schema | 1600 bytes (V2G20-1234) |
| Contract chain sent in | PaymentDetailsReq | AuthorizationReq (PnC_AReqAuthorizationMode) |
| Challenge sent in | PaymentDetailsRes | AuthorizationSetupRes (PnC_ASResAuthorizationMode) |
| Certificate messages | CertificateInstallation and CertificateUpdate | CertificateInstallation only; it also renews, and can deliver several contracts |
ISO 15118-20 also defines a pairing mode for private chargers, where the car accepts a charger certificate outside the public V2G roots; the car then sends an empty certificate_authorities list. See the ISO 15118-20 security page for the handshake details.
When the ISO 15118-20 car must answer the certificate request (always, or only for Plug and Charge) is to be checked against clause 7.7.3.
Plug and Charge authorisation in ISO 15118-2
- EV: ServiceDiscoveryReq
- EVSE: ServiceDiscoveryRes, PaymentOptionList contains Contract; the Certificate service may be offered too
- EV: PaymentServiceSelectionReq, SelectedPaymentOption Contract
- EV: PaymentDetailsReq, eMAID and ContractSignatureCertChain
- EVSE: PaymentDetailsRes, a fresh 16 byte GenChallenge and EVSETimeStamp
- EV: AuthorizationReq, echoes GenChallenge; the header carries a signature made with the contract key
- EVSE: AuthorizationRes, EVSEProcessing Ongoing while the backend checks, then Finished
- EVSE: ChargingStatusRes or CurrentDemandRes, ReceiptRequired true with MeterInfo
- EV: MeteringReceiptReq, SessionID, SAScheduleTupleID and MeterInfo, signed with the contract key
- EVSE: MeteringReceiptRes
The charger (or its backend) validates the contract chain up to an MO or V2G root, checks its revocation status, verifies the signature over AuthorizationReq with the public key of the contract certificate and compares the challenge with the one it sent. Each failure has its own response code: FAILED_CertChainError, FAILED_CertificateRevoked, FAILED_CertificateExpired, FAILED_SignatureError, FAILED_ChallengeInvalid, FAILED_ContractCanceled. The code dictionary (response-code) explains each. SQ-07 checks that Contract was offered before the car chose it, and SQ-10 that a requested metering receipt arrives.
In ISO 15118-20 the steps move: AuthorizationSetupRes announces the authorisation services and carries the GenChallenge, AuthorizationReq carries the contract chain and the signed challenge, and the signed meter reading goes in MeteringConfirmationReq.
Contract certificate installation
- EVSE: ServiceDiscoveryRes or AuthorizationSetupRes, ISO 15118-2: the Certificate service; ISO 15118-20: CertificateInstallationService true
- EV: CertificateInstallationReq, ISO 15118-2: OEMProvisioningCert and ListOfRootCertificateIDs. ISO 15118-20: OEMProvisioningCertificateChain, ListOfRootCertificateIDs, MaximumContractCertificateChains, optional PrioritizedEMAIDs. Signed with the provisioning key
- EVSE: CertificateInstallationRes, the charger relays the request to its backend and the provisioning service; the answer carries the CPS chain, the contract chain, an ephemeral public key and the encrypted contract private key
- EV: PaymentDetailsReq or AuthorizationReq, the session goes on with the new contract
The car checks the CPS signature against one of its V2G roots, runs an ECDH key agreement between its provisioning private key and the ephemeral public key (DHpublickey in ISO 15118-2, DHPublicKey with ECDHCurve SECP521 or X448 in ISO 15118-20), derives a symmetric key and decrypts the contract private key. ISO 15118-20 also allows the key to be delivered for a TPM (TPM_EncryptedPrivateKey), and reports in RemainingContractCertificateChains how many more contracts wait for the car.
ISO 15118-2 renews a contract with CertificateUpdateReq, which carries the current contract chain, the eMAID and ListOfRootCertificateIDs and is signed with the current contract key; the response has the same shape as the installation response. ISO 15118-20 has no update message and runs another installation instead.
ISO 15118-2 gives the certificate messages a longer response time than most requests; the tool uses 5 s (tim.msgTimeoutLongS), which is still flagged for verification in the limit profile. All of this runs inside TLS, so a capture shows it only when decrypted.
What this tool checks
- PK-01 compares the validity window of the charger's leaf certificate with the time of the handshake taken from the capture. It is not applicable when the capture has only relative timestamps or the certificate is encrypted (TLS 1.3 without a key log).
- PK-02 looks at every certificate of the charger chain: validity dates in UTCTime before 2050 and GeneralizedTime from 2050 (RFC 5280 4.1.2.5), no unknown or wrongly critical extensions (RFC 5280 4.2), the size limit of the profile (pki.maxCertificateBytes for TLS 1.2, pki.maxCertificateBytesIso20 for TLS 1.3), and no root inside the chain (V2G20-2399).
- TL-07 checks that a TLS 1.2 charger does not ask for a client certificate, since ISO 15118-2 authenticates the car at the application layer.
Contract certificates in PaymentDetailsReq, AuthorizationReq and the certificate messages appear as fields in the message detail, and the response codes that refuse them are reported by SQ-05.
Sources
- ISO 15118-2:2014, security concept, certificate profiles and the PaymentDetails, Authorization, CertificateInstallation, CertificateUpdate and MeteringReceipt messages
- ISO 15118-20:2022, clause 7.7.3 (TLS), certificate handling, AuthorizationSetup, Authorization and CertificateInstallation messages, V2G20-1234
- RFC 5280, X.509 certificate and path validation profile
- RFC 8446, TLS 1.3, clause 4.4.2.1 (OCSP status per certificate entry)
- RFC 6960, OCSP
- VDE-AR-E 2802-100-1, German application rule on certificate handling between vehicles, chargers and backends