The TLS handshake fails
TCP connects, the car sends its ClientHello, and the handshake ends in an alert or a reset: trust anchors, certificate validity, clocks, cipher suites and TLS versions.
What you see
- A TCP connection to the announced port, a ClientHello from the car, sometimes a ServerHello and certificate from the charger, and then an alert or a reset instead of application data.
- The stage strip stops at TCP / TLS. The verdict is TLS failure and names the alert, or the side that reset or closed the connection.
- Encrypted, not decrypted is not this symptom: the handshake completed and the tool simply has no key log to read the messages.
Likely causes
| Cause | Who | How to confirm in the capture |
|---|---|---|
| The car does not trust the charger's chain: its V2G root is not installed in the car, or charger and car use different PKIs (test and production) | EVSE setup or EV | The car answers the certificate with the alert unknown_ca (48) or bad_certificate (42); the TLS tab shows the issuer of each certificate |
| The charger certificate has expired or is not yet valid | EVSE | PK-01 compares the validity period with the time of the capture; the car sends certificate_expired (45) |
| The car's clock is wrong, so it judges a valid certificate expired or not yet valid | EV | PK-01 passes against the capture time, yet the car sends certificate_expired or bad_certificate |
| No common cipher suite or curve | Either | handshake_failure (40) after the ClientHello; TL-03 checks the chosen suite. ISO 15118-2 names two ECDSA suites with AES-128-CBC and SHA-256 |
| Version mismatch: an ISO 15118-20 car requires TLS 1.3 and the charger only speaks TLS 1.2 | EVSE | protocol_version (70) or handshake_failure; TL-02, TL-05, TL-06 |
| ISO 15118-20 groups and signatures not supported by the charger's TLS library (secp521r1, x448, ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, ed448) | EVSE | TL-05 lists what the ClientHello offered, TL-06 what the ServerHello picked |
| Chain malformed: the root sent along, or certificates larger than the standard allows or outside its profile (a missing sub CA or a wrong order shows as the alert of the car) | EVSE | PK-02 |
| A TLS 1.2 charger asks an ISO 15118-2 car for a client certificate | EVSE | TL-07; a CertificateRequest in the handshake |
| A side resets without an alert | Either | TL-04 and the verdict name who closed the connection |
Look up any alert in the code dictionary under TLS alerts. The verdict names the side that sent the alert. The alert says what that side rejected, so the thing to fix is often on the other side: unknown_ca from the car means the charger presented a chain the car cannot verify.
What to check in this tool
- TLS tab: both hellos with versions, suites, groups and signature algorithms; every handshake message; the certificate chain with validity, key usage and basic constraints.
- TCP/TLS lane: where the alert or reset sits relative to the hellos.
- Checks tab: TL-01 to TL-08, PK-01 and PK-02.
- TLS 1.3 encrypts the certificates. Load the key log of the session to see them; TL-08 says whether it opened the session.
Fixes that usually work
- Use one PKI on both sides: a test car needs the test V2G root, a production car the production root.
- Renew the charger certificate, and send the full chain (leaf and sub CAs, without the root) in the right order.
- Check the charger's clock and, where you can, the car's. A car that booted with a default date rejects every certificate.
- Configure the TLS library for the suites and curves the standard names. For ISO 15118-20 enable TLS 1.3 with the groups and signature algorithms of Tables 7 and 8.
- For ISO 15118-2, do not ask the car for a client certificate.
The ISO 15118-2 suite list and the 800 byte certificate limit (pki.maxCertificateBytes) are flagged for verification against clause 8.5.2 of the edition you test to.
Sources
- RFC 5246 and RFC 8446, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, alert descriptions
- ISO 15118-2:2014, clause 8.5.2
- ISO 15118-20:2022, clause 7.7.3, Tables 5 to 9