Worked example: the charger certificate has expired

The pnc-expired demo read step by step: a TLS 1.2 handshake for ISO 15118-2 in which the charger presents a certificate that expired three weeks before the session, and the car aborts with certificate_expired before any V2G message.

What you see

  • Load the demo Certificate expired (pnc-expired): seven events in 0.16 s, recorded on 2026-09-24. The SDP request and answer, the TCP handshake, a TLS alert and the two FINs.
  • There is no SLAC in the file: the recording starts at SDP, as a capture on the IP side of a modem does.
  • Stage strip: SDP passed, TCP / TLS failed. The app handshake and everything after it are not in the capture.
  • Three findings, all errors: PK-01, TL-01 and TL-04.

The verdict

Never charged, TLS failure, likely party EV, confidence high. The explanation reads: the TLS handshake ended with the alert certificate_expired at 0.1 s. The chain of evidence is PK-01, TL-01 and TL-04.

Reading the capture step by step

  1. EV: SDP request, 0.000 s: security TLS, transport TCP
  2. EVSE: SDP response, 0.020 s: [fe80::2]:64109, TLS
  3. EV: TCP SYN, 0.030 s
  4. EVSE: TCP SYN-ACK, 0.040 s
  5. EV: ClientHello, TLS 1.2, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
  6. EVSE: ServerHello, TLS 1.2 with that suite
  7. EVSE: Certificate, two certificates: the SECC leaf and its CPO sub-CA
  8. EVSE: ServerKeyExchange, ServerHelloDone
  9. EV: Alert certificate_expired (45), fatal, 0.140 s
  10. both: TCP connection closed, FIN from the car at 0.150 s, from the charger at 0.160 s
CertificateSubjectValid fromValid to
1, the leafCN=SECC expired demo2024-09-012026-09-01
2, the sub-CACN=CPO demo sub-CA2024-06-012030-06-01
  • The parameters are in order: TL-02 accepts TLS 1.2 for ISO 15118-2, TL-03 finds the suite in the ISO 15118-2 list, TL-07 finds no request for a client certificate.
  • PK-02 passes: two well formed certificates, UTCTime dates, known critical extensions, and no root in the chain. The chain is built correctly.
  • PK-01 compares the leaf with the time of the capture and fails: the certificate expired on 2026-09-01, the session ran on 2026-09-24.
  • TL-01 reports the fatal alert from the car at 0.140 s, TL-04 the handshake that never completed after TLS 1.2, the suite and 2 certificates were seen.

What the cause is

  • The SECC certificate of the charger ran out and nobody renewed it. The sub-CA above it is still valid, so the chain fails only at the leaf.
  • The car checked the chain against its clock and refused it with the alert made for that case. The verdict names the car because it sent the alert; the certificate to replace is the one of the charger.
  • Plug and Charge in ISO 15118-2 needs this TLS channel, so an expired charger certificate stops every car that checks it, before the car can even say how it wants to pay. Cars that do not check the validity would connect, which is why such a fault can look car specific.
  • PK-01 dates the session by the clock of the recording, not by the clock of the car. Three weeks past the end leaves no doubt here; when the gap is a few minutes, check the clocks first.

What to fix

  • Issue a new SECC certificate under the CPO sub-CA and install it with its private key. With OCPP 2.0.1 the charger asks for it with SignCertificate and receives it with CertificateSigned.
  • Watch the end dates of the SECC certificates of the whole fleet and renew them well ahead: Certificate lifecycle: validity, renewal and revocation describes the renewal and the lifetimes in the V2G PKI.
  • Keep the chain as it is: leaf and sub-CA, without the root. PK-02 already passes.

How to confirm the fix

  • PK-01 passes and shows the new validity window of the leaf.
  • The handshake completes and application data follows. Without the key log the verdict then reads Encrypted, not decrypted, which is not a failure; load the key log to read the session.
  • Compare with Worked example: the car rejects the charger certificate: there the dates are fine and the chain leads to no root the car trusts, so the car sends unknown_ca instead.

Sources

  • RFC 5246, TLS 1.2, the alert certificate_expired
  • RFC 5280, clause 4.1.2.5, the validity of a certificate
  • ISO 15118-2:2014, clause 8.5.2
  • SPEC.md of this tool, FR-ENC-05, the failing demo sessions