Security testing of chargers
What security testing covers on the charger to car link, the charger to backend link and the device itself, which regulations ask for it in the EU and the UK, which standards certification programmes use, the vehicle side under UN R155, and what published research has shown.
Three surfaces
| Surface | What is tested |
|---|---|
| Charger to car | TLS on the V2G link, certificate handling for Plug and Charge, behaviour with expired, revoked or unknown certificates, and robustness against malformed or unexpected messages |
| Charger to backend | The OCPP security profile in use, certificate management for the backend connection, firmware update signing and the security events the charger reports |
| The device | Local ports and services, debug interfaces, default credentials, the update path and the radios (WiFi, Bluetooth, cellular) |
The charger to car link
- ISO 15118-2 runs over TLS 1.2 and ISO 15118-20 requires TLS 1.3. dSPACE describes its test system as handling TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2 and scenarios without encryption, so both correct and incorrect configurations can be tried.
- CharIN conformance testing places Plug and Charge in the CCS Extended profile.
- At the 2025 North American Testival, the ChargeX prescribed test TS12 checked Plug and Charge with expired car certificates, expecting a fall back to external identification.
- The certificate roles, chains and their life cycle are in Plug and Charge and its PKI and Certificate lifecycle: validity, renewal and revocation.
The backend link
OCPP certification includes security: in OCPP 1.6, Security Profile 2 is now part of the mandatory Core profile; OCPP 2.0.1 has an Advanced Security certification profile (OCPP certification). A certificate shows the security functions work as specified, not that the product has no vulnerabilities.
Regulation
- EU: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30 makes the essential requirements of Radio Equipment Directive Article 3(3), points (d), (e) and (f), apply to certain classes of radio equipment from 1 August 2025. Point (d) asks that the equipment does not harm the network or misuse its resources, (e) that internet connected equipment protects personal data and privacy, and (f) that equipment which transfers money protects against fraud. A charger with a radio falls under it; EN 18031-1, -2 and -3:2024 are the harmonised standards cited in the Official Journal, with restrictions, by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138 of 28 January 2025, and BSI names the EN 18031 series for chargers.
- UK: the Electric Vehicles (Smart Charge Points) Regulations 2021 came into force on 30 June 2022; their security requirements in Schedule 1 apply to charge points sold from 30 December 2022. Among them: a password unique to the charge point and not derived from public information (or set by the owner), which cannot be reset to a default shared with other charge points; checks for security updates at set up and periodically after; an update applied only after its authenticity and integrity are verified; and the owner told about updates by default.
- UK: BSI also names the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) regulations as setting cybersecurity requirements for chargers. The Open Charge Alliance published a paper in January 2024 on how OCPP relates to the Smart Charge Points Regulations.
- Vehicle side: UN Regulation No. 155 requires the carmaker to run a certified Cyber Security Management System and to pass cybersecurity type approval; in the EU it applies to all new vehicles sold from July 2024. UN R156 asks for a Software Update Management System. These rules bind the car, not the charger.
Not checked for this page: which EN 18031 part and which restrictions of its citation in the Official Journal apply to a given charger design.
Standards used for certification
- Charger security certification programmes and vendors name IEC 62443 (security of industrial automation and control systems) and ETSI EN 303 645 (cybersecurity of consumer IoT devices) as their basis, beside national rules such as the UK regulations and NIST IR 8473 in the United States.
- DEKRA runs a cybersecurity certification programme for EV charging stations based on ETSI EN 303 645 and IEC 62443, in three levels with rising requirements.
- ENCS, the European Network for Cyber Security, published EV-311-2022, a set of security requirements taken from IEC 62443 for utilities and operators that procure charging stations.
- As with OCPP certification, a security certificate says a product met a set of requirements when tested, not that it has no vulnerabilities.
Published research
- "Brokenwire: Wireless Disruption of CCS Electric Vehicle Charging" (arXiv 2202.02104) interferes by radio with the HomePlug Green PHY link from outside the cable and stops the charge. The authors report it worked against seven vehicles and 18 chargers, from up to 47 m away and with under 1 W of transmit power.
- Idaho National Laboratory, with Sandia and Pacific Northwest national laboratories and funded by the US Department of Energy, built AcCCS, hardware and software that emulates either the car or the charger on the CCS link without power flowing (INL, July 2023). INL noted that CCS communication lacks mutual authentication, which leaves room for man in the middle attacks on billing and private data; the researchers used AcCCS to attack a charger and a vehicle and then showed mitigations.
- Pwn2Own Automotive, the Zero Day Initiative contest in January 2024, had home and commercial AC chargers as targets. Teams reported successful exploits against the Autel MaxiCharger AC Wallbox Commercial, the JuiceBox 40 and the ChargePoint Home Flex; IT Brew reported that every charger in the contest was exploited at least once. CVEs followed, for example CVE-2024-23938 (JuiceBox 40) and CVE-2024-23920, -23921, -23970 and -23971 (ChargePoint Home Flex), described in the write ups of Computest Sector 7.
- "MiniV2G: An Electric Vehicle Charging Emulator" (arXiv 2101.11720) describes an emulator of the V2G link built for research.
- Open source tools such as pyPLC, which can sniff a CCS session or play either side with modified powerline adapters, show that the powerline link can be observed and emulated with low cost hardware.
Vendor responses and the fix status of the vulnerabilities above were not checked for this page. Before citing one, read the advisory for the product and firmware version in question.
In this tool
- The TLS checks (TL-01 to TL-08) report handshake failures, alerts and their likely cause; PK-01 and PK-02 look at the certificates of the session.
- The certificate chain viewer in the TLS tab links the certificates the charger sent from root to leaf, with their validity on the day of the session.
- With a key log (NSS format), the V2G messages inside TLS are decrypted and checked like any other session. The demos
tls-failandpnc-expiredshow an unknown CA and an expired charger certificate. - SEC-01 to SEC-04 look at the link below TLS: a SLAC match confirmed by a charger the car never sounded, MAC addresses that change inside a SLAC run, a request for TLS answered without TLS, and a network key that is trivial or handed over twice. The Security tab puts these beside the TLS checks, the SDP security and the SLAC matches of the session.
Sources
- dSPACE: Conformance tests for smart charging, TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2 and unencrypted test scenarios
- CharIN: Conformance testing, CCS Basic and Extended
- ACM: ChargeX Prescribed Testing Program at CharIN NA 2025 Testival, report, TS12
- Open Charge Alliance: OCPP certification programme, security profiles
- BSI: EV charger guidance brochure, RED Article 3(3), EN 18031, UK regulations
- Brokenwire: Wireless Disruption of CCS Electric Vehicle Charging, arXiv 2202.02104
- MiniV2G: An Electric Vehicle Charging Emulator, arXiv 2101.11720
- pyPLC (uhi22)
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30, RED Article 3(3)(d), (e) and (f), from 1 August 2025
- European Commission: harmonised standards for radio equipment, EN 18031-1, -2 and -3:2024
- Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138, 28 January 2025; cites EN 18031-1, -2 and -3:2024 with restrictions
- The Electric Vehicles (Smart Charge Points) Regulations 2021, Schedule 1, security
- OZEV: Complying with the Electric Vehicles (Smart Charge Points) Regulations 2021, guide, version 2.1
- Open Charge Alliance: OCPP and the UK Electric Vehicles (Smart Charge Points) Regulations 2021, January 2024
- Applus+ Laboratories: UNECE WP.29 R155 and R156
- DEKRA: cybersecurity certification program for EV charging stations
- ENCS: EV-311-2022, security requirements from IEC 62443 for procuring EV charging stations
- VicOne: EV charging system protection, standards named for chargers
- INL: Intern develops technology to find EV charging vulnerabilities, AcCCS, 2023
- CleanTechnica: Intern develops technology to find EV charging vulnerabilities, 19 July 2023
- Zero Day Initiative: Pwn2Own Automotive 2024 day one results
- IT Brew: Pwn2Own Automotive showed one simple target, EV chargers, March 2024
- Computest Sector 7: Hacking the JuiceBox 40
- Computest Sector 7: Hacking the ChargePoint Home Flex
- SPEC.md of this tool, TL and PK checks, FR-TOOL-08 certificate chain, TLS decryption