Payment, roaming and Plug and Charge

How a driver pays at a public charger: ad hoc payment with a card or a QR code, contracts with a mobility service provider and the roaming protocols between backends, identification by the car with Autocharge or with ISO 15118 contract certificates, the rules that ask for each, and where a start fails.

Who is paid, and by whom

  • The charge point operator (CPO) runs the charger and its backend. The e-mobility service provider (eMSP) holds the contract with the driver, bills the driver and pays the CPO.
  • Ad hoc payment needs no contract: the driver pays the CPO directly with a card at a terminal, a QR code that opens a web payment page, or an app.
  • With a contract, the driver shows a card or app of the eMSP, or the car identifies itself. The CPO backend asks the eMSP (directly or through a hub) whether the token is valid, and later sends it a charge detail record.

Rules on payment

RegionRuleWhat it asks
European Union (Europe: AFIR, Type 2, CCS2 and ISO 15118)AFIR, Regulation (EU) 2023/1804, Article 5Ad hoc payment at publicly accessible charge points and transparent prices, applying since 13 April 2024. New points of 50 kW or more accept payment cards through a card reader or a contactless device; from 1 January 2027 so must points of 50 kW or more installed before 13 April 2024 along the TEN-T road network or in safe and secure parking areas
United States (North America: J1772, CCS1, J3400 and the NEVI standards)23 CFR 680.108For NEVI funded chargers: Plug and Charge capable ISO 15118-2 software and OCPP 2.0.1 by 28 February 2024, and charging networks able to talk to each other with OCPI 2.2.1
Great Britain (United Kingdom: smart charge points, the Public Charge Point Regulations and Type 2 with CCS2)Public Charge Point Regulations 2023Contactless payment from 24 November 2024 at new public charge points of 8 kW or more and at existing ones of 50 kW or more

For NEVI funded chargers, 23 CFR 680.106(f) sets the payment methods: unless charging is permanently free, a station provides secure payment methods accessible to persons with disabilities, at least a contactless method that accepts major debit and credit cards and either an automated toll free phone number or an SMS system with which the driver can start a session and pay. It may not require a membership, may not delay, limit or curtail power by payment method or membership, and gives access to users with limited English proficiency. North America: J1772, CCS1, J3400 and the NEVI standards carries the other NEVI rules.

Roaming protocols and hubs

ProtocolBetweenModel
OCPICPO and eMSP, or either and a hubPeer to peer, maintained by the EVRoaming Foundation: locations, tariffs, sessions, charge detail records and tokens
OICPCPO or eMSP and the Hubject platformHub, including the contract data for Plug and Charge
eMIPCPO or eMSP and the Gireve platformHub protocol created by Gireve; since 2018 the Gireve platform also connects operators over OCPI

None of these protocols runs on the charging cable. On the cable, the charger only learns that it may start: from the Control Pilot and an RFID reader, or from the ISO 15118 authorization.

Identification by the car

MethodWhat the car sendsSecurity
External identification (EIM)Nothing: ISO 15118-2 ExternalPayment, ISO 15118-20 EIM. The charger waits in the authorization loop until card, app or terminal authorises it.That of the card or app
AutochargeIts EVCCID (the MAC address of the modem), sent by the charger to the backend in an OCPP Authorize, as the Autocharge whitepaper describesWeak: a MAC address can be copied
Plug and ChargeA contract certificate: ISO 15118-2 Contract, ISO 15118-20 PnC. TLS and a signed authorization requestCertificates from the V2G PKI (Plug and Charge and its PKI)

Plug and Charge links three certificate chains: the charger proves itself to the car with its SECC certificate in TLS, the car signs with its contract certificate, and the backend checks that contract with the eMSP. Each certificate has a lifetime, and the operator must renew them in time (Certificate lifecycle: validity, renewal and revocation).

Where a start fails

  • The backend rejects the token or does not answer in time. The charger keeps the car in the authorization loop (EVSEProcessing Ongoing), and the car gives up after its ongoing timer.
  • The terminal or QR payment succeeds but the charger never receives the start command, or receives it after the car has stopped waiting.
  • Plug and Charge: an expired or unknown charger certificate, so the car aborts TLS; a contract certificate the backend cannot find; a car that offers Contract to a charger that only offers ExternalPayment.
  • Roaming: the eMSP does not know the location or the tariff, or the charge detail record never arrives, so the driver is charged late or not at all.

Field statistics on payment and start failures are collected on Reliability of public charging: what field data says.

What to record and test

  • The capture of the cable from plug in to the first current, the TLS key log for Plug and Charge, and the OCPP log of the charger with Authorize, TransactionEvent or StartTransaction, and any RequestStartTransaction or RemoteStartTransaction.
  • Tests: every payment method the site offers, an unknown token, a backend that answers slowly or not at all, a charger certificate close to expiry and expired, a contract certificate the eMSP revoked, and roaming starts through each hub. Backend, Plug and Charge and payment test cases writes them out.

In this tool

  • Demos: ocpp-rejected, where the backend answers the card Invalid and the charger keeps the car at Ongoing (Worked example: the backend rejects the card); pnc-expired, a Plug and Charge handshake the car aborts with certificate_expired (Worked example: the charger certificate has expired); tls-fail, a TLS handshake the car aborts with unknown_ca.
  • SQ-07 checks that the selected payment option was offered; TIM-02 times the authorization loop; the TL checks judge the TLS handshake; PK-01 the validity of a TLS 1.2 server certificate on the day of the session and PK-02 the form of the chain. In TLS 1.3 the certificates are encrypted, so PK-01 is not applicable.
  • The TLS tab with the certificate chain shows each certificate from the trust anchor to the leaf with its role and validity. With a key log the tool decrypts the session and decodes the messages inside.
  • The OCPP tab lines up the Authorize and transaction messages of the backend with the cable. Roaming protocols such as OCPI and OICP are not read.

Sources